This study is about the development of the Chinese movie industry through the economic and political opening of the country, from 1979 to 2015. It overviews, in the first place, the main regulations that have shaped the industry and then it goes deep into the business of moviemaking through the analysis of the studio system, the evolution of the Chinese film market and the shift in international relations the country has had regarding this cultural industry.
Introduction
Since the opening of China in 1978, the country has gone through gradual reforms in all areas of the economy, as well as modernizing and liberalizing almost all industries that were previously owned by the government. Although the main propellers of the economy were those industries behind the production of consumer goods, other secondary industries emerged from a deteriorated state and one of the best examples is the film industry. In just 30 years, the industry has evolved from almost a non-existing point to becoming the second biggest cinema market in the world.
other state-run sectors, but at least they saved some money by contracting the extra cast in the place of the location of each film (Semsel and Xia 1990) .
In January of 1985 the China Film Bureau held a conference in which two sub-reforms were announced: a price reform that would consist on the adjustment of each individual film to its market value, and an enterprise reform, which aimed to give managerial autonomy and financial incentives for increasing the production to the involved companies (Zhu 2003) . The state also passed the responsibility of distributing from the China Film Corporation to local distributors which started functioning as middleman.
In January of the following year the leadership of the Film Bureau was transferred from the Ministry of Culture to the newly created Ministry of Radio, Film & Television, also known as the RFT (Xiao 2004 ). The power struggles came soon after, due to the fact that the reform had only been made at state level, leaving provincial institutions unattended and causing glitches with the bureaucratic bickering. The only ones that were not affected by this managerial confusion were the nationalized studios (Zhu 2002) . Instead of helping ease the chaos, the Ministry of RFT went one step further and issued the "Document 975", which was centered in a distribution reform that allowed the studios to share box-office profits with the distributors (Zhu and Rosen 2010).
The instability could be perceived just as soon as 1985, when in the first quarter of the year the number of tickets sold were 30 percent smaller than during the same period in the previous year. The result of those first three months was a loss in the revenue of 9.36 million RMBs, or 1.17 million dollars. All the sectors in the industry -production, distribution and exhibition-lost money due to this, which pushed the further implementation of measures by the government and the rush in the negotiations by the studios with the China Film By the end of 1986, the organizational confusion and continuous shrinkage of the domestic film market lead to a loss of revenue of one third of all Chinese distribution companies.
Because of this, many of these companies were obliged to branch out by seeking revenues from other commercial ventures. However, the state-owned studios that were under complete governmental control were still immune to this managerial chaos (Zhang 2004).
Shanghai Studio and Xi'an Studio made echo of this problem by starting negotiation with the China Film Corporation with the aim of sharing the box-office receipts. Their negotiation was a success; they both got what they wanted, but the results, not that much. Both companies failed to make any real profits that year. Shanghai Studio discovered that their films were totally out of sync with the shifting tastes of the Chinese spectators. Xi'an Studio on the other hand, produced films that were big hits in the Chinese market, but also discovered that profits from the box-office were not as fast and as liquid as selling directly to the CFC.
In order to ease the situation, the government started funding for these studios to produce main melody films, best known in the west as "propaganda films". The government gave between one and two million RMBs per year to produce these films, which ended up being up to 25 percent of the total annual output of films (Zhu 2003) .
In 1988 the boundaries were pushed even further with a symposium known as the "Strategic Planning for the Film Industry" for a further relaxation of price controls. The only reform that prevailed through the 1980s was the price reform: while in 1980 the film prints could be purchased at 9000 RMB. By 1989, their cost was of 10500 RMB. However, instead of connecting a film's price to its market value, the price adjustment in 1989 retreated to the centralized mandatory system, contradicting the overall reform goal of reaching a market economy (Zhu 2002 (Zhu , 2003 .
Overall, during this first decade, the Chinese government kept adjusting passively and partially to the economic reforms the country was facing, and focusing only in the sectors of exhibition and distribution, forgetting almost completely about the production sector.
1990s
When the 1990s began, with the implementation of the new shared-revenue regulations, the distribution system took control of the studios. The China Film Corporation was still the one deciding how many prints it would need to distribute, and then it gave this copies to the provincial and local branch agenciesthat worked as a subordinate of the corporation. These prints were sold at a fixed price of 10500 RMB, no matter what the expectation or cost of the film was. The branch agencies accorded the distribution contracts with the projection units, who had no control over the titles that were offered at the local level. The studios were put out to deal with the risks, while the profits were kept in other parts of the channel. The screenings only gave losses to the projection units, which can be deducted from comparing the high costs of a screening (and increasing, from the 51 RMB that cost in 1983 to the 99 RMB that a single screening cost in 1988), with the very low cost of tickets (about 0.2 RMB) (Pickowicz 2012).
With these high levels of expenses almost none projection units showed profits, and if they did so, the regional branch agencies of the CFC recollected the funds in order to pay their costs. Then, these agencies gave the after-expense profits to the office in Beijing, and from that moment on, profits were divided: 29 percent of the money went to the film studios, and show any profit after that, they had to pay a high 55 percent industrial tax, which meant that during the 1980s, only two to three studios were able to show a positive balance each year (Pickowicz 2012).
However, and against all odds, in 1991 the box-office started turning around, but still at a very low speed. To propel this growth, in 1993 the government allowed the entrance of foreign movies for the first time in Chinese theaters. Soon, these movies started outnumbering the Chinese counterparts, in both the number of films screened and ticket sales. Even if the Chinese studios were not gaining almost anything directly from the foreign films, the novelty brought more people than ever to the movies that year, even to the screenings of the local movies.
The reform that had been issued on the 11 th of October of 1992 might as well had had something to do with that decline in the box office. This reform stated that now the ticket pricing would reflect better the market price of each individual film by having the owners of the movies setting the ticket prices themselves (Nilsson 2015) . These new prices ranged from 2 RMB up to 80 RMB, depending on the geographical zone and the theater.
During the 1990s the government's goal became clearer than ever: to eliminate the multilayered distribution process under the old bureaucratic system which would dredge the clogged distribution channel and encourage competition among both distributors and studios.
In 1993, and following the previously mentioned reform of 1992, the Ministry of RFT issued In January of 1995 the Ministry of RFT issued a reform that had a direct impact in the boom of new films involving private investment, by relaxing the licensing policy of production.
From this point on, any investor, even from outside the filmmaking industry, could have the right to coproduce if he were to cover 70 percent of production costs. In an attempt to imitate the western distribution method, the government also induced a division of the profits and losses among the producer, distributor, and the exhibitor. For China, having a closed economy until 1978 did not make things easy for the adaptation of the speed that other countries were going at with importing and exporting, nor did the attempts of China to maintain protectionist measures to promote internal production.
Although before 1979, only the US blacklisted the American drama,'The Salt of the Earth' thatwas imported to China (Sandhu 2014).It was not until the 1990s that the state started addressing seriously the foreign film production, most likelybecause before the structural overhaul, Chinese studios were too unproductive to compete with the big Hollywood studios.
Therefore the first film that was imported to China from the United States of America under this objective of opening the market was 'The Fugitive' in 1993. It grossed 3 million dollars in China by itself, which alarmed the Chinese authorities over the power these foreign movies had withthe local spectators (Tempest 1994) .
During 1995,between 70 and 80 percent of the whole box office profits came from imported pictures (Zhu and Rosen 2010). This did not just mean gains from foreign pictures, but it also boosted the big domestic pictures.The Chinese film 'Red Cherry' was placed on the boxoffice ratings, topping other international films, and the total return increased in 15 percent.
Hollywood's high cost of production was set as a standard measurement for quality in the Chinese studios, companies that had been budgeting on average a low 10 million RMB per film during the mid-90s. With movies like 'In the Heat of the Sun', 'The King of Lanling', 'Red Cherry', or 'Shanghai Triad', the Chinese industry started setting some investment records in the history of its national cinema.
The government saw that regulating the entrance of these films was necessary. It was then when the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television introduced the "9550 Project" that had been explained before, and which stated that a maximum of 10 foreign films would enter per year from 1996 to 2000. These films would be those which the government deemed excellent, and principally, the quota was filled almost entirely by American films, followed by those made in Hong Kong, which still counted as "foreign"(Hemelryk Donald, Hong and Keane 2014).
The regulation linked the right to distribute these foreign imports with the studios that were involved in the production of "quality picturefilms" which the government wanted to subsidize indirectly for showing the good morals of Chinese culture. In 1996 the three big studios that produced the main 10 box-office hits, Beijing Studio, Changchun Studio and Shanghai Studio, got the distribution rights of movies like Toy Story, Waterworld or Jumanji, in a shared box-office returns basis with Hollywood (Zhu and Rosen 2010).
On the other face of the coin, at the same time, Chinese films started being distributed in overseas countries by the home studios.The profits created by these imports were not reaped by the studios. These imports were run by the China Film Import and Export Corporation, and the studios that distributed the movies ended up getting only 14 percent from this corporation, who managed the solo rights to foreign buyers. The boom of the industry has had more to do with the constant growth of the population than with the direct intervention of the government in the sector. The regulations have almost always been passive and a consequence of overall economic policies rather than a specific will to reform the creative industries of the country. The conflict caused by the government wanting to liberalize the economy of the country and the will to keep having ideological monopoly through cultural industries has caused contradictions in the past, and it would not be rare to have more of those in a future.
However, the true propeller of the industry -the change in the demography of the country-is still on track. Even though the economy will suffer from the long-term failure of past policies such asthe one-child policy, which has destined the country to an inevitable aging of the population that will require a change in the taxstructure and the overall economy.Statistics say that even if China grows at a rate of a third part of its past growth rate, it will outstrip the United States in size by 2030 and will also become a high income country. 6 The increase in the living standards, altogether with the migration to urban centers and to the eastern part of could easily double its size in just some years.
Although, as it has been said that the government´s intervention in the film industry has been somewhat deficient, the strategy China is using to protect its local production is an interesting one. In a globalized state of the world and participating in organizations such as the World Trade Organization, protectionist measures are difficult to apply by themselves. Nevertheless, China has found the legal vacuum for it using censorship not as an ideological instrument but as an economical one. The WTO already dictated that China should relax its quota of international movies entering the country, but it also announced that China would still have the right to censor whichever movie they wanted. So if a foreign movie surpasses certain amount of box-office revenues, the government can use its right to ban it from the theaters alleging censorship motives.
Insiders from the sector have commented that the quota is going to be expanded soon, but no official statement has been made yet. It would be advised to have an eye on the revision of the Memorandum of Understanding that is going to be announced in 2017 and made official on the 1 st of January of 2018. The necessary steps to be taken after the memorandum to appease the international conflict remain uncertain and will depend to a large degree in which will be stated in this revision.
